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ABSTRACT 
The discipline of information security must adapt to new technologies and 
methods of interaction with those technologies. New technologies present both 
challenges and opportunities for the security professional, especially for areas 
such as digital forensics. Challenges can be in the form of new devices such as 
smartphones or new methods of sharing information, such as social networks.  
One such rapidly emerging interaction technology is the use of Quick Response 
(QR) codes.  These offer a physical mechanism for quick access to Web sites 
for advertising and social interaction. This paper argues that the common 
implementation of QR codes potentially presents security issues that must be 
considered by professionals in the area. It analyzes potential privacy problems 
with QR codes and studies a range of devices as they may have implications 
for the processes and procedures used by Information Security professionals. 
Keywords: QR codes, computer security, information security, digital 
forensics, quick response, smartphones. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Information security is the domain concerned with protecting information 
systems from potential threats. Information security is commonly benchmarked 
in terms of the attributes of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA).  
Information Security professionals are driven by ensuring that the information 
systems under their charge are protected in respect to these attributes.  
Practically, this means ensuring systems are trusted, privacy is maintained and 
information is always accessible. 
To remain viable, the profession of information and computer security must 
keep abreast of changes in the increasingly interconnected digital world. In the 
domain of digital forensics, bodies such as Scientific Working Group on 
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Digital Evidence compile best practice documents to guide security 
professional (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2013a). More 
recently, documentation of best practices has been extended to include devices 
such as mobile phones (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2013b) 
and navigation systems as these widely used devices capture and store a large 
amount of personal and environmental information in their normal operation. 
New methods of interaction including personal social networks such as 
Facebook, photo and video sharing sites such as Flickr and YouTube are also 
increasingly capturing large amounts of information about users. The sheer 
scale, volume and pervasive nature of this data being accumulated impacts 
many information security domains including issues for digital evidence. 
Consequently new techniques have to be developed (e.g., Bell & Boddington, 
2010; Piccinelli & Gubian, 2011) to extract, manage (Duranti and Endicott-
Popovsky, 2010), and analyze this data. 
A rapidly growing social interaction technology is the use of Quick Response 
(QR) codes, which are commonly used as physical shortcuts to Internet 
resources (see Figure 1). QR codes are matrix barcodes that were originally 
created in 1994 by Toyota subsidiary Denso-Wave to identify automotive 
components. The term QR code is a registered trademark of Denso-Wave 
Incorporated (Denso-Wave Incorporated, 2011); however the technology itself 
is open and free to use as it is published in ISO and JIS standards (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2006; Japanese Standards Association, 
1999).  QR codes are touted for their ease of use and convenience and are 
increasingly being used for marketing. This is commonly done by placing a QR 
code on an advertisement or poster, which when scanned with a mobile phone, 
directs the user to a Web site.  
This paper highlights, clarifies and analyses the potential implications for 
information security of the use of QR codes. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows.  Section 2 provides background on the technology and 
use of QR codes.  Section 3 provides a discussion of related research. Section 4 
highlights a series of research questions on information security issues with the 
use of QR codes. Section 5 presents a series of empirical investigations into a 
variety of issues related to these research questions.  Section 6 discusses these 
research questions in detail in light of the empirical findings.  Finally, Section 
7 presents some conclusions. 
2. QR CODES 
QR codes are a rapidly growing technology for social interaction and 
advertising. The reason for this rapid uptake is the way in which they can 
provide a connection between the physical world and the digital world (e.g., 
Internet resources). In this role, they are increasingly being used in public 
spaces and on products to provide a bridge to Web sites.  
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In this method of usage, QR codes provide little more than a physical, machine 
recognizable representation of a hyperlink; appearing on business cards, 
posters, newspapers and even television advertisements. Typically, an 
individual uses their mobile phone camera to quickly capture the QR code 
which then directs them to a Web site.  The user is presented with product 
information and is often asked for personal information.  Marketers embrace 
QR codes as they allow them to target their advertising to particular groups of 
users and specific locations.  Figure 1 illustrates a QR code for a simple 
information Web site (you may scan it with your smartphone QR reader). The 
fact that QR codes are machine-readable has the advantage of convenience (as 
little user involvement is required), however this brings with it many concerns 
for security, as the user is unable to ascertain the contents of the QR code prior 
to scanning. 
 
Figure 1 An Example of a QR Code 
The physical encoding of information in the QR code is covered by several 
standards, including JIS 0521 (Japanese Standards Association, 1999) and 
ISO/IEC 18004 (International Organization for Standardization, 2006). This is 
essential for the technology to be viable and interoperable. However at the 
application layer, no such standardization exists. Like many emerging 
technologies (especially Web based), the specifics of the implementation often 
differ greatly from platform to platform, and even vendor to vendor.  A lack of 
standardization often has severe implications for the security of any device or 
platform. Users, vendors and security auditors alike must have confidence that 
their data and applications and privacy will be handled in a consistent, 
controlled and repeatable manner. The ad-hoc nature of QR processing 
applications does little to alleviate this concern. 
Any individual or company can create QR codes by using simple Web-based 
generators that encode any text into its unique QR code representation. In fact, 
certain popular Web site redirection services now automatically generate a QR 
code for every Web site simply as a matter of course. QR codes typically hold 
around 50 characters, with newer more dense versions holding up to 1264 
characters.  This space is sufficient to allow the encoding of information such 
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as the QR code location (e.g., poster location); the use of URL shortening 
services makes it possible to encode longer URLs than would strictly be 
possible within a particular QR version. 
As noted above, the non human-readable nature of the QR data has 
implications for the trust of a Web resource being accessed. Furthermore, the 
widespread use of URL shortening services also serves to further obscure the 
destination URL of a link. These issues undermine the inherent trust associated 
with when a user manually enters in the address of a site they wish to visit. 
This opens the door for malicious users to inadvertently divert traffic to their 
Web sites, giving the user little or no forewarning that this is occurring. A user 
interface redress attack is a common technique of tricking users into clicking 
something other than what they originally intended. This may cause the user to 
unwittingly reveal personal information, open security holes in their system or 
even unintentionally buy products online. For the user interface redress 
technique to work, the actual contents of a button or link have to be concealed 
somehow and complex scripting or the exploit of known interface 
vulnerabilities is used to this end. It can be seen that a non human-readable 
resource (such as a QR code), would potentially render the user highly 
susceptible to this kind of attack. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the series of events in a typical Web request both 
without and with the use of a QR code. These demonstrate the relationship 
between the user, phone QR code and server and highlight how the use of a 
technology such as QR codes introduces potentially unknown data that will be 
treated by the device in the same way as if it were manually entered by the 
user. 
 
Figure 2 Typical Web Request 
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Figure 3 Web Request via QR 
3. EXISTING RESEARCH 
Publicly available information regarding whether QR codes have been involved 
in any recent security incidents is scarce, perhaps because there have been no 
high-profile incidents to date. However, the potential for this technology to be 
involved indirectly, or in future exploits is significant nonetheless. Around the 
2007-2008 timeframe, the German hacker “FX” described a number of 
situations in which 1-d and 2-d barcodes may be exploited to achieve a variety 
of outcomes. Some of the attacks described methods to overcome ticketing 
checks such as airline boarding passes and baggage checks, as well as other 
exploits that may utilize cross site scripting vulnerabilities or buffer overflows 
by using a 2-d barcode to point to an untrusted resource (FX, 2007). In spite of 
the fact that the recent rise in smartphone ownership has made this attack 
vector applicable to a much wider target group, little has been done to address 
these concerns to date. 
Kieseberg et al. (2010) also describe a substantial number of potential 
weaknesses in the implementation of QR code. These again hinge on the non-
human readable nature of the code and how this results in it being often 
impossible to distinguish between a valid or manipulated code. These possible 
attacks include modifications to individual components of the code (such as the 
error correction or header information) as well as attacks based on entirely 
automated processes such as those used in logistics and assembly line. 
Research is ongoing in a number of areas relating to QR codes, and this is 
especially valuable given the large measure of trust that is (often unwittingly) 
placed in the printed barcode. These codes are often used for many purposes 
other than the commonly seen advertising.  For example, the West Midlands 
Police in the United Kingdom now employ the use of QR codes to provide 
public information in the fight against crime (West Midlands Police, 2012).  
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McAfee Labs has described an Android based malware that uses QR as its 
attack vector. Whilst the code and payload of the malware is very similar to 
other common examples, this variant differs in that it uses a simple QR code to 
spread.  The code initiates a download of a trojanized application which, when 
installed, sends SMS messages to premium numbers that charge users large 
sums of money (Sabapathy, 2011). 
Attackers have also attempted to embed QR codes into spam emails. 
Embedded links in spam email contain a shortcut to a legitimate QR code 
generation service. The bookmarked shortcut that is displayed is a QR code 
pointing to a site such as pharmaceutical spam. This may seem like an unusual 
way of attacking given that the email already contains embedded links. 
However, what it demonstrates is that this method of obscuring the destination 
URL has been identified as being a workable attack vector for the spammers to 
evade traditional malicious link detection routines (such as those commonly 
applied to incoming email) (Websense Security Labs, 2012). 
As a demonstration of the level of trust that users place in the QR code, a 
poster was placed at a three day security conference, featuring the text "Just 
scan to win an iPad". Over the course of the three days, 455 unique users 
scanned the featured code and visited the associated Web page. Furthermore, 
the very presence of the poster was never called into question, in spite of it 
being unapproved. The fact that this potential attack was so successful even at 
a security conference highlights the risks that the general public may be 
exposed to (Maman, 2012). 
 4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To consider how QR codes impact the information security domain, there are 
three main areas to consider: the end user’s interaction with QR codes, the 
technical implementation aspects of QR codes and how QR codes may 
influence the conclusions drawn from data in particular in areas such as 
forensic investigations. An essential part of any successful forensic 
investigation is the clear understanding of what data is being sought and what 
hypothesis is being tested (proven or disproven). This plays a pivotal role in the 
evidence recovery and examination (Noblett, Politt, and Presley, 2000), and in 
the development of the investigation and analysis methodology that will 
follow.  
The following are a series of research questions that attempt to encapsulate this 
discussion. 
1. Can a user be tricked into visiting an illegal/malicious resource via QR 
code?  
2. Is it possible to track the users browsing history via a QR code? 
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3. Is it possible to determine if a user visited a resource via a QR code or 
via typing in the URL? 
4. Is it possible to physically manipulate a QR code to alter its contents? 
5. Can a QR code transaction lead to compromised personal data on a 
mobile device? 
6. Are QR codes sufficient for establishing the location of a user? 
7. Is it possible to uniquely identify a user who visits a resource via QR 
link? 
An important principle when dealing with any evidence, either digital or 
otherwise is that the rules of evidence must be adhered to. This means that both 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence must be submitted. Inculpatory evidence 
is evidence that supports a given theory (for example, did suspect A 
intentionally visit an illegal Web site). Exculpatory evidence, on the other hand 
is evidence that contracts a given theory. Irrespective of whether the evidence 
being collected appears to be inculpatory or exculpatory, it must be dealt with 
equally and consistently. This is firstly to ensure a correct and unbiased 
decision may be reached based on the evidence, but also to comply with 
legislation that covers rules of evidence should they be required to be used in 
legal proceedings at some future date. The analysis and discussion presented 
later in this paper does not attempt to prove or disprove any theory–but rather 
to convey all of the findings and present a discussion that will equip other 
security professionals with the insights to develop their own educated 
judgments about evidence specific to their particular cases or investigations. 
5. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
The study conducted involved a number of different tests which provided 
insights and empirical data related to the research questions that were posed 
above. The tests included data collection on both the smartphone itself, a 
forensic examination of the detailed server logs that hold the transaction 
information, and an analysis of the standards and implementation 
considerations of the technology in general.  Smartphone analysis was 
conducted to study how the application handles the entire QR interaction from 
scanning to access of a Web resource. Next, a second analysis was conducted 
which involved access to a Web resource that attempted to access the contents 
of the smartphone sensors including location and position sensors.  On the 
server side, detailed logs were kept during the entire study. The final step of the 
data collection involved subjecting these logs to a forensic examination to 
determine firstly if there are any inconsistencies between platforms, and 
secondly to establish what if any information is being communicated to the 
server without the users’ knowledge.   
Taking into account the diverse nature of mobile devices and lack of 
standardization within QR code application software, the study was conducted 
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on a range of devices representative of the three major smartphone platforms 
currently on the market. These included an Apple device running iOS, a 
Samsung device running Android, and a Nokia device running Windows. All 
of the smartphones used the most current and patched versions of their 
respective operating systems at the time of conducting the study. As a number 
of third party applications are available from the respective application stores, 
the most highly ranked two applications for each platform were chosen for 
evaluation. The Nokia device natively handles QR codes with no additional 
software required so only one other third party QR reader used on this 
platform.  
At the time of writing, the two most popular QR applications for the iPhone are 
RedLaser v4.01 and QRReader v3.0 (Apple Inc, 2012). For Android, the top 
two applications are QR Droid v5.2.1 and Barcode Scanner v4.3.1 
(Android.com, 2012). For Nokia, QR Code Reader v1.3.4462 was the highest 
rated application in the Windows application repository (Nokia Corporation, 
2012). These are also the most current versions of the applications in the 
respective application repositories at the time of writing.  For the purposes of 
the investigation, the default factory configuration of the devices operating 
system, browser and applications were used. The details of the platforms and 
QR reader applications used in this software are presented below in Table 1. 
Table 1 Hardware and Application Platforms used in Study 
Platform Version 
Operating 
System 
OS 
Version 
QR Reader 
Apple  iPhone 4S iOS 5.1.1 
RedLaser 
v4.0.1 
Apple   iPhone 4S iOS 5.1.1 
QRReader  
v3.0 
Samsung  Galaxy S2 Android 2.3.3 
QR Droid 
v5.2.1 
Samsung  Galaxy S2 Android 2.3.3 
Barcode 
Scanner 
v4.3.1 
Nokia  Lumia 800 Windows 7.5 Native Support 
Nokia  Lumia 800 Windows 7.5 
QR Code 
Reader 
v1.3.4462.27495 
 
To ensure that the test conditions and environment did not confound any 
findings, the devices were rebooted prior to each test and any memory resident 
applications were terminated where applicable. Network functionality was 
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provided by 802.11g Wi-Fi connectivity, with other forms of data 
communication (i.e., GPRS) turned off. All devices connected to the same 
access point with IP addresses allocated by DHCP. Each device was tested 
separately, and no other devices were allowed to connect to the access point 
during the testing.   
5.1 Test 1 Client side analysis of QR application software handling  
of QR transaction from initiation, scanning through to access  
of the encoded web resource 
This test studied the different handling of otherwise innocuous Web links 
encoded as QR codes. A Web link to a blank Web page was encoded into a 
basic QR image compatible with all the QR application software in use. The 
behavior of the device during this access was recorded regarding the extent and 
type of feedback provided to the user and whether any security controls were in 
place that required the user’s acknowledgement before proceeding.  
Data was recorded regarding the following aspects of the QR transaction: 
1. Is the URL displayed to the user? If applicable, how much of the field 
is shown? 
2. Is a history of previous QR codes stored? 
3. Is user interaction required to confirm the transaction (i.e., to visit the 
Web page once the QR code is scanned)?  
4. Is any warning given when Web site URL is obscured or redirected? 
5. Is the real un-obscured URL displayed if a redirection has taken place? 
The results for each of these five questions are presented in tabular form. Each 
row contains data about a particular device/reader combination and the 
numbered columns correspond to the above questions. Discussion of these 
findings is included in Section 6 of this paper. The raw findings are presented 
below in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Client Side Analysis of Standard QR Transaction 
Platform 1. 
URL 
Display 
2. 
QR 
History 
Stored 
3. 
User 
Confirmation 
4. 
Redirection 
Warning 
5. 
Redirection 
URL 
Display 
Apple 
iPhone 
(RedLaser) 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Doesn’t 
show real 
URL 
Apple 
iPhone 
(QRReader) 
No Yes No (default) No (default) 
Doesn’t 
show any 
URL 
Samsung 
Galaxy 
(QR Droid) 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Shows real 
URL 
Samsung 
Galaxy 
(Barcode 
Scanner) 
Yes No Yes Yes Shows both 
Nokia 
Lumia 
(Native) 
17 
characters 
Yes Yes No 
Shows real 
URL 
Nokia 
Lumia 
(QR Code 
Reader) 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Shows real 
URL 
5.2 Test 2 Client side analysis of access to smartphone sensor  
5.3 data via QR link 
This test studied the extent to which data from smartphone sensors could be 
obtained via a Web resource accessed via QR. As smartphone operating 
systems often expose sensor data to application layer processes such as the 
Web browser, it may be possible to read this information through a Web page 
linked via QR. 
The means by which sensor data is obtained is often platform specific and the 
three platforms surveyed do include different system level APIs to deal with 
the specific type and configuration of sensors installed on a given platform. 
However, the Standards for Web Applications on Mobile (W3 Consortium, 
2012) include several APIs to facilitate this interface between the sensor data 
on a mobile device and Web applications. The Geolocation API provides an 
interface for locating the device (independent of the underlying technology); 
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this is considered “widely deployed” and the functionality is implemented on 
most current platforms. Other APIs are in development to provide support for 
motion and proximity sensors, although these are still in development and not 
as widely deployed. 
There are a number of ways data can be collected from the user’s device and 
simply sent back to the server; this is described as follows.  Some of these are 
collected at the server side, some need to be collected in the client and sent 
back to the server: all this takes place when the Web page is opened. Data may 
include general device information, location (GPS) of the device and the 
physical orientation of the device. 
To ascertain the extent to which sensor data is revealed to a potentially 
untrusted Web site, a Web page was created which attempts to poll each of the 
above mentioned APIs to display current sensor data. The address of this Web 
page was encoded in QR format and this was used to initiate the Web 
transaction. As with the previous test, the steps were repeated for each 
combination of device and platform and the results are detailed in Table 3. In 
the table, the columns refer to the following items: 
1. Device Information: refers to if the QR application has access to device 
information, e.g., make and model of the phone.   
2. Geolocation W3C API: refers to if the QR application has access to the 
W3C Geolocation API. Prompted means that the user was prompted to 
allow this.  
3. Device Orientation: refers to the QR applications access to either basic 
HTML device orientation or detailed W3C device orientation including 
tilt. This is especially important as access to tilt sensors (or 
accelerometers) may reveal users on-screen keyboard patterns, 
including passwords (Aviv, Sapp, Blaze, & Smith, 2012).   
4. Motion Sensors: refers to if the application has access to the W3C 
standard calls for motion sensors. 
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Table 3 Client Side Analysis of Access to Smartphone Sensor Data via QR Link 
Platform 1. Device 
Information 
2. Geolocation 
API 
3. Device 
Orientation 
4. Motion 
Sensors 
Apple iPhone 
(RedLaser) 
Yes Prompted Detailed Success 
Apple iPhone 
(QRReader) 
Yes Prompted Detailed Success 
Samsung 
Galaxy 
(QR Droid) 
Yes Prompted Basic 
Device Not 
Supported 
Samsung 
Galaxy 
(Barcode 
Scanner) 
Yes Prompted Basic 
Device Not 
Supported 
Nokia Lumia 
(Native) 
Yes Prompted Basic 
Device Not 
Supported 
Nokia Lumia 
(QR Code 
Reader) 
Yes Prompted Basic 
Device Not 
Supported 
 
For this test, the W3C APIs were used as a common denominator to evaluate 
the ways in which different platforms handle the same test. It should be also 
noted that individual platforms also have their own proprietary APIs which 
may potentially expose the information in different ways. It is a trivial task for 
a Web site to automatically generate the content based on the platform being 
used to access the resource, therefore should a vulnerability or exploit become 
known for a specific platform, it is possible for a potential attacker to target 
only specific devices.  
5.3 Test 3 Analysis of HTTP Header Information  
This test studied the data that is encoded in the HTTP headers sent by the 
smartphone when a Web resource is accessed via a QR code. As there are 
many optional headers in addition to those required by the HTTP standards, it 
is possible that different combinations of QR reader/platform may encode 
different information in these headers, potentially exposing personal 
information to the Web server.  
In a typical Web transaction, the browser requests a specific resource from the 
server. Along with this request, the HTTP standard (The Internet Society, 
1999) includes several lines of header information. These provide the server 
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with context for the Web request and details on the kind of data that the 
browser can handle, what type of browser is being used and so forth. 
A Web server based tool was used which prints out the full HTTP headers of 
any given Web requests. This tool was used to collect the header information 
from the five platform/reader combinations being used. The raw header data 
was then captured and is presented below. 
iPhone 4  
HTTP_USER_AGENT  Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 
5_1_1 like Mac OS X) 
AppleWebKit/534.46 (KHTML, like 
Gecko) Version/5.1 Mobile/9B206 
Safari/7534.48.3 
HTTP_CONNECTION    keep-alive 
REMOTE_ADDR  Confirmed IP Address 
HTTP_HOST  testurl.org 
REQUEST_URI  /pc.cgi 
HTTP_ACCEPT 
 text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml; 
   q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 
HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE en-us 
HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING gzip, deflate 
HTTP_X_WAP_PROFILE
 http://wap.samsungmobile.com/uaprof/GT-I9000.xml 
HTTP_ACCEPT_CHARSET utf-8, iso-8859-1, utf-16, *;q=0.7 
 
Android 
HTTP_USER_AGENT Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 
2.3.3; en-au; GT-I9000 
Build/GINGERBREAD) 
AppleWebKit/533.1 (KHTML, like 
Gecko) Version/4.0 Mobile 
Safari/533.1 
REMOTE_ADDR  Confirmed IP Address 
HTTP_HOST  testurl.org 
REQUEST_URI  /pc.cgi 
HTTP_ACCEPT 
 application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html; 
  
 q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 
HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE en-AU, en-US 
HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING gzip 
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Windows Phone 
HTTP_USER_AGENT  Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; 
Windows Phone OS 7.5;  
   Trident/5.0; IEMobile/9.0; NOKIA; 
Lumia 800)  
HTTP_CONNECTION  Keep-Alive  
REMOTE_ADDR   Confirmed IP Address  
HTTP_HOST   testurl.org  
HTTP_UA_CPU   ARM  
REQUEST_URI   /pc.cgi  
HTTP_ACCEPT   text/html, application/xhtml+xml, 
*/*  
HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE  en-US  
HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING  gzip, deflate 
5.4 Test 4 Analysis and Modification of QR Code Data 
This test examined the structure of a QR Code to evaluate whether it is possible 
to modify parts of a code to alter its contents imperceptibly. As the codes are 
not human-readable, there is potential for changes to a code to go unnoticed to 
the casual observer. One concern is that a malicious user may modify a part of 
a QR code to point to a slightly different resource. For example, a link to 
“www.murdoch.edu.au” may be subjected to a single character change to point 
to “www.murdoch.edu.ai”. 
To investigate the possibility for such an attack, the QR standards were 
examined. The ISO 18004:2006 standard describes the layout and organization 
of a QR code.  In addition to the easily recognizable matrix of black/white 
pixels (known as the data area), there are several other fixed characteristics that 
are common to all QR codes. These include a finder pattern, a set of 3 blocks 
which are located in three of the corners of the code. These enable the scanning 
device to determine the size, orientation and angle of the symbol–without the 
finder pattern it is not possible for the scanner to recognize that a QR code has 
been presented. 
The timing pattern provides a reference for the cell pitch–this is to describe 
how wide in pixels the rows and columns are to be expected in the code. 
Finally, the margin around the data area is known as the quiet zone–this simply 
facilitates the task (for the CCD) of discerning the code from the surrounding 
image in the field of view. Figure 4 illustrates the standard organization of a 
QR code as described in ISO 18004 (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2006). 
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Figure 4 Structure of a QR Code 
Also included in the ISO standard are details of the error correcting codes that 
are to be implemented in all QR implementations. QR codes are encoded using 
Reed-Solomon error-correcting codes (Reed & Solomon, 1960). This allows 
the content to be decoded even if a certain amount of degradation of the data 
area has occurred. There are several levels of error correction available at 
creation time, and depending on the final intended use of the code, different 
requirements for error correction will be appropriate.  At the highest level of 
error correction the algorithm is capable of withstanding loss or corruption of 
up to 30% of the data area and still operating correctly. 
The next step of the analysis was to evaluate the differences in QR code 
representation of two similar text strings. To this end, the strings “ABCDEF” 
and “ABCDEG” were encoded in QR form. As the data content is very small, 
and the difference between the two strings is limited to a single character, it 
was anticipated that the QR representation would likely be quite similar. Figure 
5 shows the QR representations of the strings ABCDEF and ABCDEG 
respectively. 
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Figure 5 QR Representation of "ABCDEF" and “ABCDEG” Strings 
This type of comparison is complicated by the fact that the QR standard 
dictates that the data area is XOR’ed with an obfuscating mask during 
encoding of final output. The mask simply changes which bits are on and 
which bits are off according to a rule. There are eight obfuscating mask 
patterns defined in the QR standard. At creation time, the algorithm will 
automatically select the most appropriate mask to generate a code that will be 
the easiest for the scanner to read–this is not an option that is selectable by the 
user at run-time. This means that there are eight possible representations of the 
same data string. For this test, the QR code generator was forced to utilize the 
same mask when creating the above two codes to allow for direct comparison 
of their contents. 
These codes shown above in Figures 5 were masked and overlaid to visually 
demonstrate the extent of change caused to the code when a single character 
modification is made to the data area. The resulting difference map is presented 
below in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Difference Map 
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6. DISCUSSION  
The reliance on computer records as evidence carries additional risks as their 
admissibility may be challenged as hearsay (United States Department of 
Justice, 2009). This challenge comes from the fact that digital evidence may 
somewhat fit the definition of being a statement made by one other than the 
declarant as evidence (Federal Rules of Evidence, 2011a). Therefore, 
computer-generated records which fit into this definition may thus be 
challenged under common law. Fortunately, this is an area which has received 
significant attention and statutes such as the Federal Rules of Evidence now 
make exemptions to the hearsay rule for these computer generated business 
records, provided the supporting conditions are met including, amongst others, 
reliability and relevance.  
In the United States, the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801(6) states that 
business records are not hearsay:  
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an 
act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if: 
(a) the record was made at or near the time by—or 
from information transmitted by—someone with 
knowledge; 
(b) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted activity of a business, organization, 
occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(c) making the record was a regular practice of that 
activity; 
(Federal Rules of Evidence, 2011b). 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the 114-136 of Part II Criminal Justice Act 
2003, also clarifies that business records “created or received by a person in 
the course of a trade, business, profession or other occupation” are exempt 
from the hearsay rule and are initially admissible (Criminal Justice Act, 2003). 
Although the wording varies, the basic effect of these rules has been to relax 
the common law requirement that the person who recorded the information be 
present to testify if available. This has been quite successful in clarifying the 
position of computer-generated records. Even before the computer age, in the 
case of Transport Indemnity Company vs. Seib. 178 Neb. 253 (1965), the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska permitted systematically entered records without 
the necessity of identifying, locating and producing as witnesses the individuals 
who made entries in the records in the regular course of business. More 
recently, many courts have clearly established that computer records are 
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admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence without first asking if the records 
are hearsay1. 
The regular use of a network enabled computer (such as a smartphone) creates 
a wealth of data including computer stored information on the device such as 
history files or caches, to computer generated usage logs or server access logs 
if Web transfers took place. Many of these logs are system created and may 
also possess audit trails which can be used to support their authenticity. 
Therefore the analysis of these sources of information is potentially very 
valuable as they may directly provide a timeline of a user’s activities. 
Each research question from Section 3 will now be discussed based on the data 
collected in the empirical investigation in Section 4. 
6.1 RQ 1: Can a user be tricked into visiting an illegal/malicious  
resource via QR code? 
In many cases it is possible for the user to be directed to an untrusted resource 
with no prior notification or warning. As the results from Test 1 indicated, the 
lack of application level standardization is evident and the different 
combinations of platform and reader handled the scanning and access of a QR 
code URL in markedly different ways.  
The most concerning implementation was the iPhone/QRReader combination. 
In its default configuration, the application did not display the contents of the 
QR code to the user, and also failed to prompt the user for confirmation before 
connecting to the specified resource. This means that the user could be tricked 
into visiting any kind of resource, simply by encoding its URL into a QR code. 
The Lumia/Native combination was also cause for concern, as the displayed 
URL was truncated to a maximum field size of 17 characters. Therefore, the 
user would not be able to view any field larger than that limit. This makes it 
relatively trivialfor an attacker to hide any suspicious elements of the URL 
outside that range. For example, the URL 
www.safecomputer.hackersdomain.com would be displayed as 
www.safecomputer on this device. 
Other combinations of platform and reader properly displayed the URL and 
also prompted the user with a confirmation button before accessing the 
resource. 
Test 1 also evaluated how URL redirection was handled by the various QR 
readers. Web site redirection is a common technique used by attackers as a 
means of hiding the true URL from view from the user. URL redirection is 
                                                     
1 For further examples of cases in which computer records have been exempted from hearsay 
rules, please see Haag v. United States, 485 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Fujii, 301 
F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2002); and United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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becoming more common due to services such as bit.ly and tinyurl.com 
providing free URL shortening services with no subscription or signup 
requirements. 
There was a large amount of variance in the way that the different platforms 
handled this test. The Nokia/Native and Nokia/QR Code Reader combinations 
both displayed the real URL of the resource being visited. This is the most 
desirable behaviour as the user is presented with all of the facts and may not be 
misled into a visiting a malicious resource. The Samsung/QR Droid and 
Samsung/Barcode Scanner also both displayed the real URL of the Web site–
the Samsung/Barcode Scanner also had the advantage that the real and redirect 
URLs were both presented on screen. 
The Apple/RedLaser and Apple/QRReader combinations were the biggest 
cause for concern, as neither of these combinations displayed the real URL of 
the resource being visited. The Apple/QRReader combination did not even 
display the redirect URL thus giving the user zero feedback as to what resource 
they were accessing. The net result of this is that users using either of these 
combinations may easily be tricked into visiting a malicious resource. 
For the forensics investigator it may be difficult to establish intent when 
considering the users Web access history. The user may claim ignorance, and 
state that they were not aware of what they were accessing at the time. The lack 
of feedback from the QR application, combined with the lack of prompting in 
certain cases means that it is certainly a possibility that a user may scan an 
untrusted QR link and be automatically taken to a malicious or illegal Web site 
without their consent. 
6.2 RQ 2: Is it possible to track the users browsing history via a QR code? 
Provided the mobile phone manufacturer and the browser developers adhere to 
the W3C standards, this is not possible. Test 2 enumerated the “History” object 
while accessing the sensor data. Were this exposed, it would simply allow the 
user to determine how many items are currently in the client history (not what 
they contain). In almost all cases, the QR application initiated a new browser 
session with each scan thus resetting the History contents value to zero. In 
certain circumstances the device can be forced to use the same session, but this 
task simply increments the integer value of the History object size and did not 
yield any useful data. If a history list is present on the device, it is technically 
possible for a malicious page to force the browser to go to a previous page, but 
this is unlikely to cause any security problems as the redirection is limited to 
resources which have already been previously visited. 
Test 4 examined the HTTP_REFERER header. This optional header contains 
the URL of the resource from which the request was initiated. This allows the 
new Web page to determine where the user is visiting from. This was of 
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interest, as in some cases this may potentially give the new Web site valuable 
information about the user. As certain Web sites may encode personal 
information as part of the query string (e.g., 
http://mysite.com?login=username&password=hello), this was considered to 
be a potential attack vector. However, this header was not sent by any of the 
device combinations evaluated. Furthermore, the fact that the QR readers 
appear to initiate a new session with each scan, this means that there is no 
actual referring Web site that may be documented in this header.  
These findings have quite different implications for different stakeholders. 
From the end users point of view, this reflects a positive outcome that this 
aspect of their personal data is not directly visible to an outside party. This is, 
of course, a desirable situation–and no doubt a product of careful design on the 
part of the software and operating system developers. From the point of view 
of the forensics investigator, who may be called upon to develop a profile or 
pattern of usage for a particular user or device, this means that this particular 
mechanism may not be of use to them in this instance. However, there are 
many other existing sources of information by which an investigator may pull 
together patterns of usage. 
6.3 RQ 3: Is it possible to determine if a user visited a resource via  
QR or via typing in the URL? 
On the server side all of the requests appear identical, therefore it is not 
possible to determine if the user clicked on a QR link or typed in a URL 
manually. On the client device itself, there are traces of the transaction left 
behind that may be analyzed to ascertain the origin of the request. The internal 
browser on the device may store a history of all Web transactions. This would 
confirm that the Web site has been visited but once again does not show where 
the request originated from.  
The QR reader applications also store a history, and in some cases this includes 
meta-data regarding when the link was scanned and accessed. This is the only 
information that can be used to link a Web access to a QR code, and given that 
all of the applications handle this task differently, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that the integrity of this data may be questioned. 
As with the case of Research Question 1 described above, in the case of access 
to illegal or prohibited resources, the process of establishing intent may be 
confounded by this blurring of QR vs. manually visited Web resources. In the 
course of an investigation there is potential for a user to simply claim ignorance 
and state that they clicked on a QR link and that took them to the illegal 
resource. In many jurisdictions it is necessary to demonstrate that the accused 
committed a deliberate act (i.e., prove intent) or that they did indeed have 
knowledge and awareness of the outcome of their actions. The act in itself does 
not necessarily make a person guilty if these elements are not present. 
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If a single access is being considered, and no other record of activity or access 
is present, then it may be impossible to prove or disprove this assertion. During 
a forensic investigation it may be necessary to demonstrate a certain pattern of 
access on the part of the user. In the absence of a QR code history, then this 
may be a complicated task and evidence of a single illegal transaction, may 
prove little at face value. 
 
6.4 RQ 4: Is it possible to physically manipulate a QR code to  
alter its contents? 
As QR codes are increasingly being used and trusted by the public, the task of 
ensuring that QR codes are legitimate becomes more important. QR codes are 
often presented alongside easily recognizable and protected brand material 
which people implicitly trust. However, the QR codes themselves are visually 
unidentifiable from one other. There is therefore a concern that the contents of 
the QR codes could be modified or that QR codes could be simply replaced by 
covering the QR code with another. 
The second concern is that QR codes could be slightly manipulated to change 
the URL being represented by them. Due to the fact that, like barcodes, 
different QR codes are visually very similar, there is a concern that legitimate 
QR codes may be slightly modified to direct users unwittingly to an untrusted 
resource.  
Test 4 performed an analysis on QR codes to see the output of QR generators 
with slightly different text and investigated if small changes could be made to 
QR codes to change the encoded URL address.  This analysis revealed that it is 
not feasible for the contents of a legitimate QR code to be modified or altered 
as the modifications needed to the QR code would be substantial. Changes of 
between 7 and 30% of the pixels (depending on ECC in use) of an existing QR 
code may still result in no net change to the QR contents. Furthermore, any 
inadvertent changes to the finder or timing patterns would render the code 
unusable.  
Two QR codes containing almost identical character strings were encoded and 
compared. Due to the low data density, the codes utilized in the test were V1 
codes providing a 21x21 matrix totaling 441 blocks. As can be seen from the 
difference map in Figure 5, the QR images are significantly different. Pixel by 
pixel analysis indicated that the single character change in the encoded 
message resulted in a reorganization of 10.2 % of the total pixels in the code. 
The V1 standard states that of the total 441 addressable blocks, only 208 of 
these blocks are actually data blocks. The rest are used for timing, reference 
and positioning information as mentioned above. Taking this into 
consideration, the analysis was repeated and revealed that this single character 
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change in the encoded message actually resulted in a change to 21.6% of the 
data region. 
Thus, this test has demonstrated that whilst it is technically possible to alter the 
contents of a QR code, it is by no means a trivial undertaking. Simple filling in 
of white spaces with dark space would not be enough as the replacement of 
large parts of the QR code is necessary. However as it is very difficult to 
visually discern between any two QR codes, there remains the potential for an 
attacker to entirely replace a QR code with another. There is also the possibility 
that the attack may concentrate not on the data part of the QR code, but on the 
header information. This could theoretically change the character encoding or 
character count fields and cause a buffer underflow or overflow. This potential 
attack has been previously identified in literature however no practical 
evaluation was conducted at that time (Kieseberg, et al., 2010). 
These tests are more directly related to the potential computer security 
vulnerabilities than a forensics investigation process. However, there are 
foreseeable situations in which these findings have a bearing on an 
investigation. Forensics investigation routinely involves either the attribution 
of a document or record to its source or authentication of the document 
authentication. As the QR code is a physical and not an electronic record, the 
mechanisms by which this record may be validated and assessed are limited to 
more traditional means, outside the domain of digital forensics. However, as 
Test 4 has demonstrated very small changes in the data content of a QR code 
result in a large and easily detectable change to the final QR output. Therefore 
the process of document authentication is greatly simplified provided the 
investigator is aware of the original and intended contents of the QR code. 
6.5 RQ 5: Can a QR code transaction lead to compromised personal  
data on a mobile device? 
There is nothing inherent in the nature of the QR code transaction that would 
result in the vulnerability of personal data. However, as discussed above in 
Research Question 1, the QR code is a viable attack vector by which malicious 
users may direct traffic to their own Web site. To this end, the dangers to the 
user are the same as those associated with visiting any untrusted Web site. 
Vulnerabilities in computer systems are regularly discovered and exploited by 
attackers to acquire personal data. Smartphones are not immune to this form of 
attack, and should be treated in the same way as a home or office computer, 
and protected adequately. The recently announced Android malware genome 
project (Zhou & Jiang, 2012) has already catalogued over 1200 examples of 
malware on this one platform alone. Many of these samples use Web 
technologies to replicate and spread. This highlights the extent and rapid 
growth of malware in this arena. It is conceivable that attackers may employ 
QR based “clickjacking” techniques to direct users to spread their malware. 
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Another potential way in which personal data may be compromised comes via 
a more indirect route. Test 2 investigated which, if any of the smartphone 
sensors’ values may be exposed to an attacker via a QR code. Amongst the 
sensors evaluated, was the on board accelerometer. It has previously been 
demonstrated that the onboard accelerometer can be used to infer the 
keystrokes that the user is entering on a touchscreen (Cai, 2012). This is done 
by mathematically modeling the relation between onscreen tap events (i.e., 
touching an on screen keyboard) and the motion of the phone. This proposed 
mechanism has been successfully implemented, and several key loggers have 
been demonstrated which use only the accelerometer of the device is used as an 
input. The results from Test 2 indicated that the iOS based applications did 
provide detailed motion and tilt information to the calling application (Web 
site), thus it is conceivable that this could be another potential area to exploit. It 
is also likely that investigation of the device specific APIs may provide further 
scope for smartphone sensor access, which may reveal similar vulnerabilities in 
the Windows and Android platforms. 
The investigation process, either traditional or digital, is ultimately a fact-
finding exercise. Thus data obtained from smartphone onboard sensors is a 
potentially valuable and rich source of information about both the event that 
took place, and the context such as environmental and situational 
characteristics that surrounded that event. These, often very diverse sources of 
information may appear peripheral when considered in isolation, but when 
combined, these may form an indispensable information source to the 
investigator. As such, the analysis and understanding of specific device sensors 
and the range of APIs in use is a crucial area of digital forensics. 
6.6 RQ 6: Are QR codes suitable for establishing the location of a user? 
In some circumstances, a QR code scan may result in the location of the user at 
the time being divulged. This can happen through several means. Firstly, the 
QR code itself may be unique to a particular location. As the codes are not 
human-readable, there is no way of determining if the QR code is unique to the 
location and it is thus possible that different variants of QR codes may be 
situated in different places, thus making it possible to determine the physical 
location of the client at the time of scanning. However, this task is confounded 
by the history functionality provided by the majority of readers. Test 1 showed 
that 5 out of 6 of the most popular readers store a copy of the QR codes. These 
may later be scanned and revisited at leisure. Therefore it is entirely possible 
that the user may appear to “scan” the code when they are actually in a 
different location altogether. From the point of view of the forensic 
investigator, this information alone may not be sufficient to establish the 
location of the user and it must be used in conjunction with other data such as 
the originating IP address of the access. 
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Test 2 attempted to access the sensor API on the smartphone itself. All of the 
smartphones utilized in the study contained on-board GPS chips, so it was 
logical to attempt to access this. As seen in Table 2, it was possible to access 
the GeoLocation API on all devices; this gives the current latitude and 
longitude of the smartphone within 5-6 meter accuracy. However, all QR 
reader attempts to access this API were preceded by a prompt. Whilst 
prompting the user for permission is indeed a necessary element of secure 
browsing, the de-sensitization of users to these prompts may render them to be 
little more than an inconvenience that the user will pay little attention to before 
clicking.  
Establishment and verification of alibis is a routine part of an investigation. 
Thus the forensics investigator may often be called upon to provide insight into 
this area. As discussed above, the fact alone that a QR code has been used is 
not necessarily sufficient to establish that the user was in a particular physical 
location at the time of access. Other sources of information must be used to 
complement this date in order to make any concrete assertions. 
6.7 RQ 7: Is it possible to uniquely identify a user who visits a  
resource via QR link? 
As well as possibly revealing a user’s physical location (as discussed in 
question 6), QR codes offer the possibility of identifying a user’s Internet 
location and device details.  When a user uses a QR code to visit a Web site, 
various details of the user and device are revealed. Test 3 investigated this by 
looking at the HTTP header information sent with the QR application request. 
The HTTP_USER_AGENT header identifies the hardware device, operating 
system browser of any HTTP request. This is present in order to assist the 
HTTP server in targeting the correct content for the device, e.g., providing a 
mobile device optimized version of Web page rather than a full screen desktop 
version.  The HTTP_USER_AGENT reveals rich information about a mobile 
phone; including the make and model that can then be used to find out further 
information from other sources such as the manufacturer. 
As well as hardware information, the HTTP headers include the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address of the device, which is unique on the Internet. Although 
services such as network address translation (NAT) may allow multiple devices 
to share addresses, the address still is useful as it permits identification of the 
locality and Internet provider, information which may later be used to uniquely 
identify a device and user. Aside from this data, there were no other non-
standard headers sent by any of the devices.  
To clarify, this test was not to ascertain if a particular known user had accessed 
a QR link from their mobile device. If this were the aim, then more 
straightforward mobile forensics techniques may be a more suitable first port of 
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call. This test was rather to ascertain if, from the server side alone, it is possible 
to know which mobile user is scanning (and thus accessing) the QR link. This 
information would potentially be a security risk as it would provide malicious 
user knowledge of unique user patterns and physical locations at various points 
in time. However, the results of the server log analysis have indicated that on 
the devices tested, there is no uniquely identifying information sent during the 
QR link access.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The dramatic rise in the uptake of QR codes is evident in market research 
statistics. The MultiChannel Merchant annually surveys approximately 1000 
respondents primarily based in the USA. In 2011, the results indicated that only 
8% of retailers were using QR technology. This is a significant amount, but 
certainly not the landslide that had been predicted. This year however, the same 
survey indicates that 47% of the respondents said they are using QR codes, 
with an additional 15% of respondents planning to implement this or similar 
technologies in the near future (MultiChannel Merchant, 2012).  
As with any technology that experiences such rapid growth and uptake, there is 
a clear risk that there may not be commensurate developments in the area of 
security. Technical security exploits and weaknesses are often only discovered 
after they are exploited by malware, in many cases this may have already 
spread and caused widespread damage. In this particular situation the matter is 
confounded by the combination of both technical vulnerability and human 
factors involved in this interaction. The likelihood of security breaches, 
potentially without the user’s knowledge has profound implications for the 
digital forensics or security investigator as they may be required to investigate 
an incident about which the alleged perpetrator has no actual knowledge. In 
such a situation, it will be necessary to have a clear understanding of the 
technology and the risks it poses in order to distil the facts from the large 
amounts of (potentially conflicting) evidence that may be presented. 
The lack of application layer standardization in the manner in which this 
technology is handled is cause for concern. The empirical tests discussed in this 
paper have demonstrated the diversity of implementations, and the ad-hoc 
nature in which the data is processed–in many cases these go against well-
established practices for secure interface design. The tests revealed that there 
are platforms that do not prompt the user before visiting an untrusted resource, 
those that do not display the actual URL of the resource to the user (even if 
they attempt to locate it), and those which reveal the contents of the 
smartphone onboard sensors (such as GPS and positioning) to an untrusted 
Internet host. The fact that such diverse results were found even with a 
relatively small variety of QR application software and hardware also has 
implications for the forensic investigation process. In a domain where accuracy 
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of facts and consistency of procedures is essential, this means that access logs 
and auditing information from a mobile device may not be sufficient in 
isolation. Instead, these must be supplemented with additional investigation 
regarding the specific details of the software and hardware involved so as to 
place any findings within the context of the expected behavior of the platform. 
A “one size fits all” approach is not currently possible, although the 
development of a standardized set of procedures is a valuable direction for 
future research in this area. 
Security vendors are beginning to take note of these problems, and whilst some 
of them mention the risk on their Web sites or technical reports they offer little 
in the way of solutions. Symantec software has recently released QR code 
scanning software called Norton Snap (Symantec Software, 2012). When 
smartphone users scan a QR code with this application the data is relayed to 
Norton’s threat database, which then returns a threat rating for the resource. 
Based on this information the user may then opt to visit or not visit the Web 
site in question. Tools like this are a valuable step in the right direction. 
However, as the user’s security behaviour is the root cause of the vulnerability 
such applications will be unlikely to entirely solve the problem. 
As long as the common misconception persists that smartphones are any 
different or more secure than a regular PC, such attacks will always exist. 
Widespread awareness and understanding of these issues amongst security 
professionals and end users alike is the front line of defense against the 
vulnerabilities associated with new and emerging technologies. It is hoped that 
the research based insights and discussion presented in this paper will 
contribute to this goal, and to a more secure mobile communications 
environment. 
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